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1 – The context of the book
In the analytical tradition, metaphysics history is broadly told 
like this: first, Carnap attempted to show that metaphysical 
discourse was meaningless. Then, Quine’s critique of 
empiricist’s dogma rehabilitated metaphysics, understood as 
the logical analysis of scientific discourse. Finally, Armstrong, 
Putnam, Kripke (among others) reintroduced a metaphysics 
aiming at describing objective reality (Maurin & Brinks 2005; 
Ladyman & Ross 2007). 
The new motto is now: ‘Talk about the talk about the universe 
is not talk about the universe’ (Heil 2003). As sciences are 
also undeniably talking about the universe, it makes sense 
to associate the metaphysical and scientific endeavors. 
These endeavors should be ‘continuous’ (Paul 2012).  If one 
starts from the assumption that scientific theories are firmly 
established, one can hope that grounding metaphysics on 
scientific theories would yield firmly established metaphysical 
assertions (Humphreys 2013).
As a consequence, two kinds of metaphysics should be 
distinguished: naturalized and speculative metaphysics. 
Because of its continuity with the sciences, the former is 
designed to be objective, certain, and consensual. The latter 
is subjective, uncertain, and conflictual: it remains the 
battlefield of arbitrary worldviews. Metaphysicians may hope 
again, provided they renounce to speculation. Farewell to 
speculative metaphysics, hail to naturalized metaphysics! 
The time of consensual metaphysics has come!
As you might have guessed — or as you already know — it is 
not quite so. The conflicts are far from being settled. It is quite 
the opposite. Old-fashioned debates among metaphysicians 
on the ultimate nature of reality, free will, substantialism 
vs. relationalism, nominalism vs. universalism, etc., are still 
around. Additional meta-metaphysical debates have recently 
emerged, opposing anti-metaphysicians and metaphysicians 
(van Fraassen 2002), proponents of speculative metaphysics, 
and proponents of naturalized metaphysics, as well as 
proponents of various ways of conceiving naturalization.
This crisis of the naturalization project obviously raises the 
question of the value of this project: can it hold its promises? Is 
it doomed to fail? If yes, why? If not, what could be improved? 
These are the questions that set the background of Anjan’s 
Chakravartty’s latest book. Scientific Ontology. Integrating 
naturalized metaphysics and voluntarist epistemology 
(Hereafter abbreviated SO) could be understood as an 
attempt to draw the lessons of the persisting disagreements 
among metaphysicians.
The book has three (or four) parts. First, Chakravartty explains 
why he denies the possibility of clearly separating 1. science 
and metaphysics 2. naturalized and speculative metaphysics. 
Second, he offers two case studies of irreducibly antagonistic 
debates falling within the domain of naturalized metaphysics: 
the debate over the reality of dispositional properties and the 
debate regarding the structuralist interpretations of quantum 
mechanics. Third, Chakravartty criticizes perspectivism and 
articulates the tenets of his voluntarist epistemology. The 
‘coda’ of the book deals with Sextus Empiricus.
Chakravartty’s work is pleasing to read, very informative, 
and thought-provoking. A part of what makes its reading 
so enjoyable is that it does not bluntly expose a theory. It 
is an inquiry, starting with a general question, which leads 
to another question, which leads to another question, etc. 
until an ultimate point is reached. I will not try to narrate all 
the details of this journey: it would be a redundant, boring, 
and pale reproduction of a glittering intellectual dance. 
Instead, I will first reconstruct the structure of Chakravartty’s 
argument, and then present an objection.
Essay Review of
Scientific Ontology. Integrating naturalized metaphysics and vol-
untarist epistemology, by Anjan Chakravartty, Oxford University 
Press, 2017
Sommaire
                 
1 – The context of the book
2 – Chakravartty’s slippery slope problem
3 - Chakravartty’s naturalized metaphysics 
problem 
4 - Charkravartty's solution to the slippery 
slope problem
5 - Chakravartty’s solution to the naturalized 
metaphysics’s problem
6 - An objection
Keywords: philosophy of science, metaphysics
13





2 – Chakravartty’s slippery 
slope problem
Chakravartty frames the problem of the delimitation of 
naturalized metaphysics as an instance of a more general 
problem, the slippery slope problem. Let us start by spelling 
out the premises of this general problem.
Ontology is consensually defined as ‘the study of what there 
is,’ of ‘what things, what kinds of things, exist, and what those 
things or kinds of things are like.’ According to Chakravartty, 
ontological commitments result from ‘metaphysical 
inferences’ (from now on: MI). These inferences are 
dubbed ‘metaphysical’, not because of their form (which 
is not specified), but because their empirical premises 
are not sufficient to derive their conclusions: they bring 
into play a priori considerations (SO, 35). These a priori 
considerations belong to two kinds: presuppositions and 
values. Presuppositions have a cognitive content. They are 
the additional premises necessary to draw conclusions from 
empirical facts. They are ‘functioning as a sort of launching 
pad’ (MO, 71). Theoretical values intervene in the evaluation 
of MIs (SO, 71). The mechanism of such intervention has 
been brought out by Duhem (1906) and Quine (1951): since 
theoretical choices are empirically underdetermined, one 
needs to use theoretical virtues in order to determine which 
option to prefer.
 
Chakravartty seems to assume that MIs instantiate the 
following properties:
1. MI is an inference: it infers a proposition (the 
conclusion) from other propositions (the premises).
2. MI is ampliative: the premises and the conclusion do 
not have the same truthmakers.
3. MI is iterative: the conclusion of one MI can be the 
premise of another.
4. MI is explanationist: the truth of p should be inferred 
from the truth of q if the truth of q would explain the truth 
of p (Lipton 2004).
From these primitive features, it follows that:
5. MI is non-exclusive: since one single fact can have 
several explanations, explanationism entails that two MI 
starting with the same premises can result in opposite 
conclusions. In other words, the conclusion of an MI is 
factually underdetermined (Bryant forthcoming).
6. MI is uncertain: since the premise and the conclusion 
do not have the same truthmakers, the truth of the 
premises does not logically necessitate the truth of the 
conclusion. In other words, the premises could be true 
and the conclusion false. The uncertainty of MI also 
follows from the underdetermination of its conclusion.
It is useful here to introduce some analytical tools. Four 
categories of relations between different MIs could be 
distinguished:
 
Dependence: the premises of an MI directly or indirectly 
produces the conclusion of another MI.
Divergence: the two MIs are directly or indirectly 
derived from the same premises.
Convergence: the two MIs are neither dependent nor 
divergent but have the same conclusion.
Parallelism: the two MIs are neither dependent, 
divergent, nor convergent.
It is clear that if ontological disagreements stem from 
inferential differences, this characterization of MI supports 
the distinction between two kinds of disagreements: 
Horizontal disagreements: It occurs when people’s 
contrary beliefs belong to the same inferential level, that 
is, when these contrary beliefs inferentially result from 
the same set of premises; 
Vertical disagreements: It opposes people who are 
willing and people who refuse to make a new inferential 
step based on a set of beliefs. 
For instance, the opposition between the substantialist and 
the structuralist interpretations of quantum entities is a 
horizontal disagreement, whereas the opposition between 
(moderate) empiricists and scientific realists is a vertical 
disagreement. Moderate empiricists accept the MI, which 
concludes from phenomenal consciousness to the existence 
of the objects of our perception, but do not accept the MI, 
which concludes inferences from the objects of our perception 
to unobservable objects (SO, 54).
Horizontal disagreements revolve around the right 
conclusion of an MI. Vertical disagreements revolve around 
the very reliability of such an MI. Therefore, horizontal 
disagreements presuppose vertical agreements: philosophers 
would not debate over the right ontological conclusion to 
draw from quantum mechanics if they did not believe in their 
ability to reach such conclusions. The vertical disagreements 
are the deepest since one side regards the other’s endeavor 
as meaningless. The deepest disagreements are generally the 
less loud: when someone thinks that a question cannot be 
settled, she simply avoids attending certain conferences and 
reading certain papers. On the opposite, there is a common 
interest to make empty debates the loudest possible so that 
people forget about the question of its epistemic values (as 
well as its other values). The fiercest disagreements are not 
the deepest.
Chakravartty’s is more interested in explaining vertical than 
horizontal disagreement (SO, 201). Therefore, in order to 
understand Chakravartty’s problem, the dependence relation 
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between MIs is the most relevant one. Iterability enables the 
creation of metaphysical inferential sequences. An inferential 
sequence has a point zero — the premises from which 
everything else is derived, but which are not themselves 
derived of anything —, but potentially no endpoint. Such 
inferential sequence constitutes a strictly ordered set. This 
property enables Chakravartty to offer a metric: in such an 
ordered set of MIs, it is possible to compare de distance of 
two MI from point zero. Chakravartty calls this point zero 
‘ground’ and this distance ‘the distance of metaphysical 
inference from the ground of empirical inquiry’ (SO, 84). 
According to Chakravratty, the point zero of the metaphysical 
inferential sequence is the phenomenal consciousness: we 
directly know what state of our mind there is. Correlatively, 
not using any MI amounts to being a phenomenalist (SO, 54).
A metaphysical inferential sequence instantiates three 
properties, essential to Chakravartty’s account. First, it 
is ‘continuous’ in the sense that there is no qualitative 
distinction between two successive MI since these cognitive 
processes belong to the same kind. The distinction between 
them is quantitative: it is a function of the number of MI 
separating them or of the number of MI separating each 
one of them from the ground. Second, the sequential 
character of MI entails the cumulativity of the conclusions 
of all the MIs composing a given sequence. The longer the 
inferential sequence, the richer the ontology. Third, the 
sequential character of MI also entails the cumulativity of the 
uncertainties of all the MIs composing a given sequence. As 
a consequence, metaphysical inferential sequences obey the 
following law: the informativity of the sequence is inversely 
proportional to its certainty. The further an MI is located in 
this sequence, the most informative and uncertain it is.
The association of this law and the continuity of the inferential 
process brings about a threat of a slippery slope (SO, 75, 82): 
one could start by accepting common sense realism and end 
up as a speculative metaphysician. 
In order to avoid such a slippery slope, one must be able 
to decide where to stop. In Chakravartty’s term, one needs 
to decide where to draw the ‘ontological limit’ (SO, 16, 82, 
84). That is, one must determine where is the point in the 
inferential sequence beyond which the addition of a new 
inference no longer makes it possible to reach conclusions 
that are sufficiently certain to count as knowledge. Borrowing 
from Bas van Fraassen’s (2002) terminology and from its 
interpretation by Paul Teller (2004), Chakravartty calls 
‘stance’ the decision of drawing an ‘ontological limit’. A stance 
is Teller’s ‘epistemic policy’ applied to MIs.  For example, an 
empiricist adopts the epistemic policy of rejection MIs from 
the observable to the unobservable. Therefore, an empiricist 
will regard any proposition concerning the unobservable 
are uncertain. Therefore, she will suspend her judgment 
whenever confronted with such a potential belief.
We can now understand one of the main claims of the book: 
vertical ontological disagreement stems from a disagreement 
between stances. Indeed, if one refuses a MI, one should also 
refrain oneself from accepting any entities whose existence is 
only proven by this MI. In Chakravartty’s words:
‘Differences among philosophers and scientists regarding 
ontological commitments are a function of some of the 
epistemological commitments these people are wont to 
make.’ (SO, 45)
3 – Chakravartty’s naturalized 
metaphysics problem
Scientific ontology is understood as what science teaches us 
about ontology: there are atoms, quarks, mitochondria, E Coli, 
black holes, etc. Naturalized metaphysics is understood as 
the endeavor to draw an ontology from established scientific 
theories. In order to grasp Chakravartty’s conception of 
scientific ontology, let me introduce a distinction between 
two possible conceptions of scientific ontology.
Literalism: scientific ontology can be directly read off 
science.
Interpretivism: scientific ontology cannot directly be 
directly read off science. An additional interpretation is 
needed.
Correlatively, there are two ways of conceiving the method 
of naturalized metaphysics: literalist (for instance Quine) or 
interpretivist.
 
Chakravartty rejects the former and adopts the latter 
position. His first premise is a delimitation of what knowledge 
counts as scientific. The word ‘science’ ambiguously refers: 
sometimes it refers to scientific practices, sometimes it refers 
to scientific theories, and sometimes it refers at the same time 
to practices and theories. Therefore, a distinction should be 
drawn between ‘science simpliciter’, ’empirical-scientific 
investigation,’— the practices — and ‘scientific ontology’. 
’Science’ properly understood refers to ‘empirical-scientific 
investigation’ (SO, 80). 
The second premise is that ‘[s]cientific] practice all by itself 
underdetermines scientific ontology’ (SO, 237). Therefore, 
according to Chakravartty, theoretical entities are not 
scientifically known.
The conclusion is that, without an interpretation, science 
reveals nothing about the world. Science requires 
philosophical discussions in order to support a given 
ontology: ‘[s]cientific ontology is metascientific’ (SO, 33). 
‘Metascientific’ interpretation should then be conceived as 
.
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the cognitive process concluding what there is (i.e., scientific 
theories) from the experimental practices. This metascientific 
interpretation is naturalized metaphysics’s work.  
In Chakravartty’s framework, the naturalization of 
metaphysics program should be functionally construed as 
a possible solution to the slippery slope problem. In other 
words, naturalized metaphysics should be seen as a stance. It 
is ‘intended to arrest one’s fall at precisely the point at which 
one would begin to make inferences whose connections to 
scientific-empirical evidence have become so attenuated 
that they no longer are good bets for scientific ontology’ (SO, 
70). The scientific ontology should then be reinterpreted as 
the result of the application of the naturalized metaphysics 
stance.
According to this interpretation, the naturalized metaphysics 
program relies on three assumptions:
Assumption 1: the factual content of scientific theories 
is a safe bet for knowledge.
Assumption 2: the factual content of scientific theories 
does not exhaust all possible knowledge.
Assumption 3: it is possible to draw a line between 
naturalized and speculative metaphysics.
The demarcation between naturalized and speculative 
metaphysics should be cashed out in terms of the differences 
between their inferential support. The distinction between 
these inferential supports relies on the premises of these 
inferences. The naturalized metaphysics epistemic policy 
prescribes to trust metaphysical inferences whose premises 
are scientific. And it proscribes to trust MI whose premises 
are located further down the slippery slope. In other words, 
one should trust MIs that are sufficiently close to the scientific 
content to be reliable and reject MIs that are too distant. 
Thus, the ‘norm of naturalized metaphysics’ (SO, 66) can be 
formulated as follows:
The principle that scientific ontology is properly delimited 
by metaphysical inferences and propositions that are 
sufficiently informed by or sensitive to scientific-empirical 
investigations as to provide or constitute ontological 
knowledge relating to the sciences (SO, 67).
In order to know when to implement this rule, one must know 
which attitude to adopt regarding a given inference. This 
decision requires knowing when an inference is sufficiently 
close or dangerously distant from the scientific content. But 
this raises, once again, the slippery slope problem. Therefore, 
the naturalized metaphysics is an incomplete solution. It is 
too general. As Chakravartty puts it: ‘A shared principle of 
demarcation does not by itself entail a shared conception of 
where to draw the line’ (SO, 66). One needs to know first how 
to decide which inferences are too empirically distant from 
experience to be reliable. Therefore, the possibility to apply 
the norms of naturalized metaphysic relies on the possibility 
to give a solution to the slippery slope problem.
4 – Chakravartty’s solution to 
the slippery slope problem
Chakravartty holds that vertical ontological disagreements 
result from diverging stances. What are the parameters 
determining the adoption of a given stance, i.e., to accept or 
reject a given kind of MI? 
According to Chakravartty, each MI is associated with a certain 
level of ‘epistemic risk,’ defined as ‘a feature of propositions 
(and the inferences generating them, as conclusions) that 
determines how confidently one is able to judge whether they 
are true or false; that is, whether and to what extent they are 
conducive to knowledge’ (SO, 84). Therefore, the decision to 
adopt a given stance depends on the responses given to the 
two following questions:
Measurement of the epistemic risk (MER): What 
is the epistemic risk associated with a given kind of MI?  
Determination of the epistemological threshold 
(DET): Beyond which level of epistemic risk the 
conclusion of an MI does not count anymore as a piece 
of knowledge?
The level of epistemic risk is inversely proportional to two 
parameters: ‘explanatory power’ and ‘empirical vulnerability’. 
Therefore, MER imply the two subsequent questions: 
Measurement of the explanatory power (MER-
EP): What is the explanatory power of the hypotheses 
justified by a given MI? 
Measurement of the empirical vulnerability 
(MER-EV): What is the empirical vulnerability of the 
hypotheses justified by a given MI? 
MER-EP is a well-known epistemic mechanism in the 
philosophy of science. It depends on the theoretical values 
(simplicity, generality, precision, fertility, coherence) 
implemented by the explanatory hypothesis involves by a 
given MI.
Regarding ‘Empirical vulnerability’, ‘which concerns how 
susceptible a proposition is to empirical testing’ (SO, 85), 
I must confess my puzzlement. As a follower of Peirce, I 
believe that the creation of a new term of art is a decision 
of consequence. When the expression is redundant with an 
already existing expression, it gives the impression that there 
is a difference where there is actually none, that something 
new is said where only well-known ideas are rehearsed, 
thus creating a ‘confusion of ideas’. I agree with Michael 
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Strevens (2018) to say that this ‘empirical vulnerability’ 
is nothing more than the old fashioned ‘testability’. In 
his response, Chakravartty explains that the rationale for 
this terminological decision is to avoid the presupposition 
that testability is necessarily intertwined with explanatory 
power (Chakravartty 2018). This seems true. If empirical 
testing amounts to check how a hypothesis is confirmed or 
disconfirmed by empirical evidence, any test should involve 
some an MI of the purported evidence, and thus explanatory 
powers. The susceptibility of testing is, therefore, the 
susceptibility of having explanatory power. However, it is 
difficult to understand why it is not also the case of ‘empirical 
vulnerability’. But let put these quibbles aside for now since 
they are not central.
The identification of the parameters determining the adoption 
of a given stance raises a normative as well as an explanatory 
question. First: what stance is epistemically prescribed? 
When are MI reliable, and when are they not? Second:  from 
the perspective of the agents, are decisions to stop at some 
point down the slippery slope, i.e., stances, arbitrary? What 
leads a virtuous epistemic agent, i.e an agent sensitive only to 
epistemic goals and reasons, to adopt one stance rather than 
another?
As the two parameters determining a stance adoption are 
both normatively and explanatorily relevant, six questions 
should be distinguished:
Normative MER-EP: How to evaluate the explanatory 
power of an MI?
Normative MER-EV: How evaluate the empirical 
vulnerability of an MI?
Normative DET: Where the epistemological threshold 
should be located?
Explanative MER-EP: How do epistemic agents 
evaluate the explanatory power of an MI.
Explanative MER-EV: How do epistemic agents 
evaluate the empirical vulnerability of an MI.
Explanative DET: How do epistemic agents determine 
their epistemological threshold?
Anjan Chakravartty does not explicitly address the normative 
questions. For this reason, he focuses almost exclusively on 
the explanatory questions.
This choice might result from two terminological decisions. 
In Scientific Ontology, ‘stance’ does not only refer to an 
epistemic policy (Teller 2005; Boucher 2014) but to a 
subjectively motivated epistemic policy. Correlatively, 
‘epistemic voluntarism’ claims that the adoption of a policy 
stems from a choice whose value cannot be demonstratively 
established. Because this use of stance is at the same time 
descriptive and explanative, it foreshadows the possibility of 
alternative questions, namely, of the normative investigation.
This blind spot stems from another terminological choice. 
As Chakravartty decides to indifferently call ‘metaphysical 
inference’ any ampliative inference, all these inferences — 
inductions, abduction, inferences to the best explanation — 
seem to belong to the same kind. Therefore, this designation 
makes it difficult to see why one should prefer an MI over 
another MI since the relevant differences between differents 
kinds of inferences are overshadowed.
However, Chakravartty presents two dilemmas helping the 
reader to grasp a rationale for not taking the possibility of 
a normative account of stances seriously. Regarding the 
normative DET, Chakravartty follows van Fraassen (2002), 
who follows James (1896). In ‘The Will to Believe’, James 
notices that the imperative prescribing the maximization 
of knowledge is ambiguous. The goal of gaining knowledge 
is, at the same time, the goal of maximizing the number of 
our true beliefs and the goal of minimizing the number of 
our mistakes. The problem is that in order to minimize the 
number of our mistakes, we should renounce to maximize 
our true beliefs, since we should suspend our judgment as 
soon as there is a slight doubt concerning its truth. On the 
opposite, to maximize our true beliefs, we should not be so 
cautious and accept many dubious beliefs. This dilemma 
easily translates to the case of MI. Because of the explanatory 
nature of MI, gaining ontological knowledge provides an 
understanding of the world. One must, therefore, choose 
between having certain beliefs and obtaining the intellectual 
pleasure of understanding. There seem to be no principled 
way to solve such a dilemma.
Moreover, Chakravartty holds that MER-EP is necessarily 
subjective. As he himself notices (SO, 229), his argument is 
very close to Kuhn (1977)'s. Kuhn introduces the following 
dilemma: since there are several theoretical virtues, and since 
two competing theories can instantiate different virtues, one 
needs not only to decide which theoretical properties to count 
as theoretical virtues but also to decide how to hierarchize 
these values. For example, one can favor the simplicity of an 
explanation over its fecundity, or the opposite. It is easy to 
see that there can be a whole bunch of such dilemmas.
To summarize, in order to normatively justify the adoption 
of an epistemic stance, one needs to solve James and Kuhn’s 
dilemmas. In order to solve these dilemmas, one needs to make 
value choices. Therefore, to rationally prescribe a stance, one 
would have to rationally prescribe the endorsement of values. 
As Chakravartty thinks that such rational endorsement is 
not possible, he also rejects the project of deontologically 
prescribing stances.
Does that mean that epistemic agents are unable to adopt 
stances? In the same way that doubt leads to the suspension 
of judgment, axiological indecision should lead to the 
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suspension of stance endorsement. But it is not quite so. Since 
people subscribe to different ontologies, and since ontology 
is the result of a MI and since the use of MIs is prescribed 
or proscribed by stances, everyone adopts a stance. This 
indicates that, as a matter of fact, people make value choices 
(SO, 220).
Let us not turn towards Chakravartty’s solution to the 
explanatory problem of stance adoption. The intervention 
of value judgments is necessary to solve both James’ and 
Kuhn’s dilemmas. How to explain value judgments? They 
cannot be normatively determined. Therefore, they are 
subjective. Then, borrowing from James, Chakravartty calls 
‘temperament’ the unexplainable fact that individuals have 
value preferences causing stance choices.
To make this account clearer, it would have been necessary 
to distinguish more explicitly between James’ and Kuhn’s 
dilemmas, and correlatively between the kind of values 
which help to solve the former and those needed to solve the 
latter. To solve James’s dilemma, one must choose between 
cautiousness and boldness, conservation and revolution. To 
solve Kuhn’s dilemma, one must choose between a taste for 
simplicity, for precision, for amplitude, etc. James’ values are 
rather moral and related to action. Kuhn’s values are rather 
aesthetic and related to cognitive experience.
If there are two kinds of subjective values, there should be 
two different subjective relations to the adoption of these 
values. Now, the notion of temperament refers rather to 
moral values. Therefore, temperament should not be related 
to aesthetic values. For analytical purposes, we could call 
‘sensibility’ the relation to Kuhnian values. And ‘personality’ 
the sum of temperament and sensibility.
This distinction is important for two reasons. First, it 
brings out theoretical possibilities that are overshadowed in 
Chakravartty’s account. There is no correlation between the 
subjectivity or the objectivity of the two kinds of values. There 
could be subjective Kuhnian values and objective Jamesian 
values, or the opposite. Second, and more importantly, without 
this distinction, Chakravartty’s account is either incoherent 
or dramatically confusing. Following van Fraassen, he 
contends that the only rational norm is pragmatic coherence. 
But if only the temperament and Jamesian values are taken 
into account, there is no plurality of subjective elements, and 
without a plurality of subjective elements, there is nothing 
that needs to be pragmatically coherent. And if this plurality 
is internal to the ‘temperament’, this term is a catch-all and 
blurry notion. For this reason, from now on, I will substitute 
my terminology to Chakravartty’s.
Sensibility is the fact that people solve Kuhn’s dilemma, 
temperament the fact that they solve James’s dilemma, 
the interaction of temperament and sensibility with a kind 
of MI brings about a given stance. All this process can only 
be subjective. Does it entail that rational deliberation and 
discussion — philosophy — has no say in the determination 
of stances? Not so fast! As temperament determines which 
level of certainty one aims at, and as sensibility determines 
how one estimates the level of certainty of a given MI, and as 
stances result from these two determinations, incoherencies 
are possible. One can fail to endorse an MI whose certainty 
passes the epistemological threshold, or inversely. Therefore, 
there can be rational and irrational stances. And the adoption 
of a stance can be rationally discussed (once temperament 
and sensibility are made explicit). One can reflexively come 
to change one’s stance.
This conception of rationality is pragmatic, conditional, and 
permissive. It is pragmatic since the function of reason is to 
motivate a decision, namely, the decision to adopt a stance. 
In order to do so, one must deliberate so that to find the 
right means to reach one’s goal. It is conditional since the 
determination of the means and of the goal is subjectively 
given. In the case at hand, the goal is error avoidance or 
information increase; the means is uncertainty measurement. 
As a consequence, it is not possible to rationally prescribe an 
attitude: different goals associated with the same uncertainty 
estimation, or the same goals associated with different levels 
of uncertainty, can rationally justify different stances. It is 
rationally possible to proscribe, but not to prescribe certain 
stances. This is why Chakravartty calls ‘permissive’ this 
account of the function of reason.
5 – Chakravartty’s solution to 
the naturalized metaphysics’s 
problem
Let us now turn to the consequence of the voluntarist 
epistemology for the problem of naturalized metaphysics. 
Since the naturalization project aims at producing a 
metaphysics which is almost as certain as science, it should 
indicate where to locate the epistemological threshold between 
reliable and unreliable metaphysics. But as Chakravartty 
holds that it is in general impossible to rationally justify such 
a frontier, it is impossible to say whether a given piece of 
metaphysics is too speculative or not. Therefore, the project 
suffers from a ‘debilitating vagueness’ (SO, 71). Therefore, 
voluntarism implies a skeptical response to the problem of 
naturalized metaphysics: one can define it, but not recognize 
it. 
 
On its positive side, the voluntarist epistemology implies 
that there will be several ways of conceiving and practicing 
naturalized metaphysics. If the scientific content reduces 
to experimental practices and if the MI that these practices 
ground are reliable, any scientific realist should count 
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scientific theories as naturalized metaphysics. If one believes 
that MI in general are reliable, even Lewis’s On Possible 
Worlds could count as naturalized metaphysics (SO, 246).
6 – An objection
To sum up, the book’s main claim is in its subtitle: ‘integrating 
naturalized metaphysics and voluntarist epistemology’. The 
idea is that ontological disagreement (i.e., disagreement 
about what there is in the world) should be understood along 
with the voluntarist epistemology, that is, the claim that our 
beliefs are the results of epistemic policies subjectively chosen 
on the basis of one’s values. Taking inspiration from James 
(but one could find the same idea in Fichte or in Nietzsche), 
quoted at the very beginning of the book, Chakravartty then 
claims that metaphysical worldviews ultimately result from 
philosophers’ temperaments. In a nutshell: temperament 
causes stances adoption, which in turn causes ontological 
beliefs.
If Chakravartty is right, the lesson to be drawn is quite 
radical: there is no principled frontier between speculative 
metaphysics and naturalized metaphysics. The naturalization 
project was bound to be a failure. Any attempt to rationally 
solve disagreements is bound to failure. Our subjective 
a priori are unsurmountable obstacles to any consensus. 
Therefore, it seems that we are back to the positivist starting 
point: empiricism vs. metaphysics taken as a whole. If one 
cannot resist the temptation to build a metaphysical theory, 
she should do so as a form of artistic worldmaking (with the 
additional constraint of coherence).
This absence of demarcation has broad consequences, 
for Charkavartty conceives the metaphysical enterprise 
in a spectacularly extensive way: not only it comprises 
classical metaphysical entities, such as possible worlds 
or dispositional properties, but also the philosophical 
discussions about scientific theoretical entities. Not only it 
comprises the question of the existence of theoretical entities 
as discussed by philosophers of science, but also the question 
of the existence of these entities as discussed by scientists. 
Therefore, according to Chakravartty, the scientific realism 
debate is a metaphysical debate as well as the interpretation of 
the CERN experiment on the Higgs Boson. And the assertion 
of the existence of Covid19 is metaphysical. And therefore, 
the skeptical (or relativistic or deflationist or subjectivists) 
conclusions of his book apply to the philosophy of science as 
well as to scientific theories.
Is the case for such a radical position compelling? Although I 
enjoyed a lot reading the book, and was taken by the dynamic 
of the argumentation, I could not shake the impression that 
the theory it develops is self-defeating: Scientific Ontology 
develops a metaphysical theory proving the essential 
unreliability of metaphysical theories.
 
Scientific Ontology presents many signs of skepticism. First, 
the book supports a skeptical claim, namely impossibility 
to know where to draw the line between naturalized and 
speculative metaphysics (SO, 89). Moreover, the permissive 
conception of rationality entails that it is impossible to prove 
anything: we should therefore renounce to justified beliefs 
(SO, 229-234). Finally, the two case studies, central in the 
book, strictly apply Pyrrhonean argumentative guidelines: 
they present symmetrical argumentations pro and contra 
two contradictory positions, aiming at producing an ‘equal 
strength’ state in the readers’ minds (SO, 243). Following 
Berkeley, Chakravartty holds that the only thing that we 
know for sure are the states of our minds, and all the rest is 
open to interpretation (to paraphrase Jim Jeffreys) (SO, 54).
According to Scientific ontology, metaphysics postulates the 
existence of entities on the basis of their explanatory power. 
Scientific ontology postulates stances and temperaments on 
the basis of their explanatory powers. In his discussion of the 
sociologist deflation of metaphysical questions, Chakravartty 
claims that Kuhnian paradigms are theoretical entities — 
thus metaphysical entities — since they are explanative 
and unobservable. I can find no reason why Chakravartty’s 
temperaments should be regarded differently.
Moreover, as we have seen, temperaments are located at 
the ultimate point of an explanatory regress. To postulate 
the existence of self-explanative entities is a classical 
metaphysical move. The main argument for this entity 
could be formulated like this: ‘beliefs are adopted because 
of stances, stances are adopted because of values, values are 
adopted because of temperaments, and temperaments are 
causes without causes’. 
Metaphysical postulates produce explanatory problems: 
additional metaphysical postulates are then needed to 
provide solutions. In order to reconcile their conception of 
quantum mechanics with the existence of causal relations, 
structuralists must defend the existence of either internal 
relational properties (Esfeld 2009) or of abstract causation 
(French 2014). Similarly, in order to reconcile his psychologist 
conception of ontological choice with the possibility of 
rational discussions, Chakravartty needs to idiosyncratically 
redefine the power of reason. A strange claim then leads to an 
even stranger claim. 
Chakravartty could probably respond here that temperaments 
are observable and that, therefore, the ‘empirical vulnerability’ 
of his hypothesis is very high. Therefore, his theory is not 
a metaphysical, but a scientific theory. However, according 
Scientific Ontology asserting observables already counts 
as a metaphysical claim. Anyways, the properties that the 
word ‘temperament’ designates in Chakravartty’s vocabulary 
(desires, aptitude to deal with risk…) are not directly 
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observable, when these properties are instantiated by other 
minds. And those instantiated by my own mind might not be 
introspectively accessible (Bryant forthcoming). Moreover, 
the claim that temperaments are observable, since they are 
familiar entities, would be an equivocation. Chakravartty’s 
temperament is functionally defined as that entity which 
explains stances, which in turn explain ontological 
differences. Therefore, the ‘temperaments’ needed by his 
theory works are not the ‘temperaments’ of our everyday life. 
Michael Strevens (2018) has objected that Chakravartty’s 
theory predicts that instrumentalists lack courage and the 
scientific realists are brave. But this is obviously false. In 
his response to Strevens’s critique, Chakravartty (2018) has 
himself insisted that everyday temperament and stance’s 
temperament should be distinguished.
 
The liar paradox is a recurrent conundrum of skeptical 
positions. To avoid this self-defeating charge, Chakravartty 
could repudiate the claim that his position is skeptical. 
After all, he contends that there is knowledge: the stances 
determine what one regards as knowledge. But as stances 
depend on the epistemic agents’ values, such conception 
of knowledge is relativistic. For instance, according to this 
analysis, it is impossible to say whether the sentence 'high 
energy physicists know that the Higgs Boson exists’ is true or 
false. This sentence can be true for a scientific realist and false 
for an empiricist. Its truth value is perspective dependent 
(Kusch 2019; Baghramian 2019).
However, Chakravartty denies being a relativist. To be fair to 
him, I shall quote his text at length:
I expect that some readers will be worried about even 
the possibility of pluralism regarding ontology, but lest 
anyone be concerned unnecessarily, it is worth pointing 
out that the kind of variance in ontologies that such a 
pluralism would allow is not one according to which the 
holders of different stances are licensed to hold mutually 
contradictory beliefs regarding matters of putative fact. 
This is precisely the result feared by those who object 
to epistemic relativism, in which one person asserts a 
proposition, P, another asserts not-P, and there are no 
grounds even in principle on which to conclude that 
either is mistaken. The possible pluralism licensed here 
in connection with stances is not relativistic in this way. 
Where someone adopting the metaphysical stance may 
be tempted to affirm certain propositions regarding 
unobservable objects, events, processes, and properties, 
the holder of the empiricist stance does not deny such 
claims. Rather, the empiricist simply has no beliefs at 
all concerning such propositions. Where a certain kind 
of scientific realist might affirm the existence of quarks, 
the empiricist does not deny their existence but simply 
remains agnostic about them. In this way, the latter’s 
scientific ontology may be a subset of the former’s, and 
this should assuage much of whatever concern there may 
be regarding the nature of rationality in this context, since 
there is no question of sanctioning contradictions. (SO, 
50)
The idea is that epistemic voluntarism does not allow 
situations where it could be at the same time true that Higgs 
Boson exists and does not exist. Indeed, suspending one’s 
belief regarding a proposition simply means that we do not 
know whether it is true or false. So Chakravartty’s position 
does not entail first-order truth-value relativism. However, as 
knowledge ascriptions are also proposition, the principle of 
contradiction should not hold in the case of epistemological 
propositions. Epistemic voluntarism entails a second-order 
truth-value relativism. 
Another possible solution to the self-defeating problem is to 
construe Chakravartty’s position as deflationary. A position 
regarding a debate is deflationary when it holds that the 
enunciations constitutive of this debate do not have truth 
values at all: therefore, there are no real contradictions 
between propositions. Contrary to appearances, arguments 
concerning the naturalization of metaphysics only express 
subjective values. So, a large part of the debate should be 
replaced by the exposition of subjective axiologies (Lewis 
2018; Chakravartty 2018). However, as Chakravartty himself 
notes, deflationary position must posit an explanatory basis 
(SO, 42-3). As this postulation is metaphysical, pragmatic 
contradiction looms again. 
The last hypothesis that I could come up with to solve the self-
contradiction problem is radical subjectivism: subjectivism 
ascribed not only to the objects of the book, but also ascribed 
to its author himself. Chakravartty subjectively holds that 
any metaphysical choice is subjective. Such a position would 
be perfectly coherent. It is the Pyrrhonean attitude that 
Chakravartty favors. But Scientific Ontology should then be 
read as a beautiful piece of conceptual poetry.
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